Nietzsche and History

Nietzsche and History:

Ask the Greeks

In this essay I will illustrate the relationship between Friedrich Nietzsche’s conception of ‘living’ and his notion of history in the essay The Uses and Disadvantages of History for Life. I will argue that Nietzsche’s conception of life draws from Greek culture and that this perspective serves as the basis of his critique of history as antiquarian, monumental, and critical.

            The quote from Goethe placed at the genesis of this essay captures and establishes the core assumptions of Nietzsche’s enterprise.  Nietzsche assumes there is a distinction between values insofar as they relate to life; there is a difference as it were between things that ‘merely instruct’ and things that augment or directly invigorate’ life (59).  This duality sets up Nietzsche’s meditation and serves as the basis for his critique of history. Before I unpack what Nietzsche means by history I will expand on his concept of life.

            In the preface Nietzsche states that he is a ‘pupil of earlier times’ (60), implying that he is looking at the subject of this essay from the perspective of a classicist. This will prove important in the way Nietzsche understands life throughout his essay. This point is initially manifested when Nietzsche sets up an ‘observation that everyone must have made’ between a man of ‘superlative health, vigour, and a joy to all who see him and a man that ‘sickens and collapses’ (63). The only difference between these two men is that while the frail one possesses knowledge and truth, the vivacious one is ignorant of them.  Even though the frail man has knowledge he does not live a fulfilled life in the sense that Nietzsche means it; one would only want knowledge to the extent that it provides you with ‘vigour and superlative health’; there is no value in truth for its own sake. One only need look at the heroes of the Homeric epics or the Diskobolus of Myron to see the importance of a vigorous existence on the Greek ethic; the very ethic Nietzsche depicts in the man of ‘superlative health’ and assumes in his critique of history.

            How does this conception of life underlie Nietzsche’s critique of history? First and foremost Nietzsche is concerned with history insofar as it contributes or negates the fullness of ‘living’. While history may have aspects that are detrimental to living, the’ services of history’ are required for life to ever actualise itself. (67) Examples of this duality can be drawn from Nietzsche’s description of history as monumental, antiquarian, and critical. I will now provide a brief definition of these three historical ‘species’, followed by ways in which these methods of history can be detrimental to life and complement it.

The basis of monumental history according to Nietzsche is the supposition that there exists common bond between humans that persists through time history is viewed as ‘a chain (which) unites mankind across the millennia’. (68) This link assures that events in the past retain an importance for humans across time and can furthermore be used by one to define the age he or she is in. The monumental perspective of history is conducive to Nietzsche’s idea of life because it inspires one to achieve greatness and excellence. Insofar as one’s historical narrative features instances that make such heroism seem possible (68), it is ultimately non-realisable as one can never fully bring the past into the present; one will attempt to establish something antonymous to existence and will meet resistance when doing this; existence and monumental history are diametrically opposed.  

            Antiquarian history is the use of history whereby one maintains the past with the ethos of a curator; there is an inherent ‘piety’ in preserving the past. An antiquarian history is one which ‘preserves and reveres’ the past for its own sake and develops the present with this ideal. While an antiquarian view of the past helps one develop a firm identity and comfort in his or her environment, it hinders potentiality by lowering ones ‘field of vision’; one easily accepts the present condition without having a thirst for more; antiquarian history is detrimental to life because it teaches one how to ‘preserve life, not engender it’. (75)

Critical history is expressed when one subjects the past to judgement and revision in the spirit of ‘inplant(ing) in (oneself) a new habit’. (76) In order to ensure this new ‘instinct’ or ‘second nature’, one must ‘combat’ the history that made the existing habit possible so that it can ‘wither away’. (76) While a critical history is used with the intent of alleviating the burdens that one’s ancestor have left (historical action/belief) on present society, Nietzsche claims it is ultimately ‘not possible to free oneself from this chain’. (76) One is ultimately condemned to the illusion of ones freedom from the clasps of past when doing critical history; while one can feel miles away from an old ideal, it remains that ‘we originate in them’. (76) Is illusion inherently detrimental to life? According to Nietzsche, life needs ‘an atmosphere’ without which it will grow ‘hard and unfruitful’. (97)

In conclusion, it is evident that the tripartite methods of history laid out by Nietzsche in this essay are in some senses worth something to life and in others detrimental to it. Whereas Nietzsche’s question of whether these histories stand up to the demands of an exuberant life serves as the basis of this essay, the basis for this question is his Grecian lens.