Frege and Fodor:
Methodology in Cognitive Science and Analytic Philosophy
In this presentation, I will show that Fodor’s guiding insight in Concepts: Where Cognitive Science Went Wrong is the distinction between epistemological and metaphysical theories of concepts. Drawing from the chapter one of Concepts, I will first give a sketch of Fodor’s view that much of cognitive science is methodologically bankrupt insofar as it builds a theory of concepts on the basis of concept use, and not on the basis of a concept’s objective nature as a mental particular; a concept that is independent of one’s epistemic capacities. In what I hope will shed light on Fodor’s own position, I will look at Frege’s Grundlagen der Arithmetik and primarily focus on his concept of ‘Number’ as analytic/a-priori, his criticism of subjectivist accounts of Number, and finally elucidate what Michael Dummett coined the ‘linguistic turn'; what I think Fodor is really responding to in his critique of cognitive science. I will then argue that while some have understood Frege through Dummett’s reading of section 46 of the Grundlagen, where he reads Frege as saying concepts should be understood in terms of their use, there are good reasons for thinking that the ‘linguistic turn’ is not Frege’s. This will show that the spirit of Fodor’s text, insofar as it seeks a cognitive science that treats concepts ontologically, maps quite nicely onto the guiding methodological and metaphysical principles set out by Frege at thebeginning of the Grundlagen.
Frege is a strict externalist[1] when it comes to concepts; a concept’s nature is quite independent of one’s capacity for such a concept. When attempting to secure the concept of Number itself, Frege excludes any account of Number that is contingent on human capacities. This prohibition extends to seeing Number as a) the property of external things (§21), b) a subjective idea one applies to experience (§26), c) a by-product of intuition (§40), and d) something learned during development by virtue of induction (§9). While these might be seen as harsh restrictions, his initial elucidation of the ethos of his text in the introduction, in which he states the rationale that guides his text, is quite indicative of his commitment to fix the nature of concepts in a way that does justice to their objective, external, and overarchingly metaphysical role within the bounds of “the laws of logic”. (Frege IV) He doesn’t say much about what this metaphysics is in the Grundlagen; he hints towards platonism in stating that objects need not be physical. (§61) For example, Frege argues in the introduction that while mathematical skill may be developed over time, this question of capacity for mathematical thought is quite a different question than the ontological question; mathematical capacity ‘does not prove that numbers are formed in some peculiarly mechanical way, as sand, say, is formed out of quartz granules”. (IV)
In critiquing different methods of assessing the concept of number, Frege describes what he takes to be a psychological explication of number; any explanation of the concept of Number which is constituted by an empirical description; the concept of Number as a development over history, the physiology of human beings as grounding the concept of Number, as well as any view of Number as contained in ‘mental pictures’ or ‘ideas’. (IV) Frege is clear that such a ‘psychological’ methodology is unfounded, and this is shown by the the first of his three fundamental principles of his enquiry: ‘always to separate sharply the psychological from the logical, the subjective from the objective’. (X) What method does Frege have in mind? As mentioned earlier, Frege sought the objective nature of the concept of Number; anything that characterises Number as part of a ‘pebble and gingerbread arithmetic’ will simply not do insofar as it characterises Number as a by-product of ‘inductive inference’. (§10) Frege wished to ground the definition of the concept of Number as achievable ‘analytic/a-priori’ and indeed believed he had succeeded in coherently proving this with theGrundlagen, however, his discussion in the introduction should lead one to think that a definition wouldn’t exhaust the nature of the concept; a definition is epistemic in a way that number ontologically speaking is not. (§108) This will become clearer in the next section where I will illustrate what Dummett has hailed ‘the linguistic turn’ in section 46.
We all know how what happens in section 46: Frege argues that it would ‘shed some light’ on the analysis of the concept of Number to ‘consider (it) within the context of a judgement which brings out its basic use’. (§46) In what Dummett calls ‘the linguistic turn’, Frege attempts to see Number as ‘something asserted of a concept’, and only understandable, as the second guiding principle of theGrundlagen states, ‘in the context of a proposition’. (X) So perhaps one can look at the use of a concept, but does that tell us anything about the concept of Number itself? Frege’s move captures what Dummett called a change from seeking the meaning of concepts in their objective form, and attempting to understand concepts within their linguistic context; hence the dictum: ‘the meaning of a concept is constituted in its use’. What I want to argue is that one should not conclude that Frege is in anyway throwing away the notion of concepts as objective, and even Dummett acknowledges this; while the ‘linguistic turn’ is a methodological innovation, it is not in fact a substantive methodological decision resembling a paradigmatic shift in Frege’s metaphysics; the decision is more of a pragmatic consideration one can embark on in attempting to approach the nature of number.[2] This is where Fodor comes in: the nature of concepts should be sought within metaphysical considerations and not epistemic ones. What does this mean and how does it relate to Frege? I will show in the next section that Frege’s ‘solution to the difficulty’ has, in the eyes of Fodor, led to fundamental axiomatic shortcoming in cognitive science as a research program.
In chapter one of Fodor’s Concepts, Fodor comes clean about just how far-reaching his book intends to be; the notion of concepts as capacities, which he claims underlies “much of our current cognitive science and practically all of our current philosophy of the mind’, is built on a “metaphysical subtext”. (Fodor 2-4) Fodor’s key idea in this chapter is that fixing the objective nature of concepts, one of the key aspects of any successful cognitive science, should be guided by metaphysical considerations rather than epistemic; “what concepts you have is conceptually and metaphysically independent of what epistemic capacities you have”. (6) In reacting to what he labels as a view of concepts as capacities, one which much of cognitive science is said to hold, Fodor advances his view of concepts as ‘mental particulars’; ‘(to) follow this course is in effect to assume that it’s OK for theorizing about the nature of concepts to precede theorizing about concept possession.” (3-6) Fodor's assumption is that cognitive science needs an account of concepts, and such an account dictates the nature of research in cognitive science. Insofar as cognitive science sees concepts as capacities, they fail to see what concepts actually are; what Fodor argues are mental particulars. Seeing concepts epistemically is, Fodor argues, 'where cognitive went wrong'. Fodor's assumption, I would argue, is Fregian in spirit; Fodor has realised that dispositional analysis, the kind of analysis that Frege opposed to in the Grundlagen, is endemic to cognitive science, just as it was for uncovering the foundations of arithmetic, insofar as it fails to secure objectivity; cognitive science should not only be concerned with concepts use, but also with concepts themselves.
If one fixes a view of concepts based on their use, then one has not fixed the metaphysical conditions of them; their objective nature. While Frege argues on a pragmatic basis that one should look at concepts based on their use, if one sees the spirit of his work as grounded in the understanding of the difference between the objective and the subjective, then is there not a contradiction between Frege’s solution and his goal? If one sees Frege as an externalist with respect to concepts, I.E. the constitution of concepts exist independently of human beings, then I would argue that Fodor and Frege agree that:looking at a concept A’s use does not fix concept A’s nature. One need not be a platonist to see the importance of an externalist view of concepts in cognitive science: in using an analogy, atomistic concepts can be understood in light of platonic forms; they exist independently of their instantiation, and by extension, fixing their essence is a consideration quite distinct from fixing the conditions of a concept’s use, or even one’s idea of a concept. Furthermore, the form of objective concepts for Plato shape the nature of judgements in the same way that concepts as external mental particulars shape propositional attitudes, thought, and reasoning. Even Socrates knew that the only thing Meno’s knowledge of geometry revealed was that certain seemingly a priori concepts could be accessed through recollection; he didn’t argue that the nature of the concepts was constituted in this recollection or demonstration of this knowledge. However, the meaning of concepts as external in Fodor’s sense is quite distinct from what Frege means by external if Frege is to be interpreted as a platonist. I would argue however that Fodor’s notion of externality of concepts within the mind, along with the notion that many concepts are innate can be understood in light of Frege’s guiding principles.
While Fodor is, I would argue, an externalist about concepts in the basic sense where concepts exist independently/”prior to understanding how we know what it is”, there is an obvious sense in which Frege would not argue, I think, that ‘the natural home of a theory of concepts is part of a theory of mental states”. (6) Frege did hold that concepts could be non-physical; something that mental states surely are not if cognitive science is a physicalist mental theory. However, maybe there is a methodological point to what Fodor is saying that is perhaps similar to what Frege had in mind with his supposed ‘linguistic turn’, and something that might even be a true help to cognitive science; while concepts may be prior to our thoughts about them in the same sense that Number would be for Frege, and furthermore, while their true nature might not be best characterised by their use, there is a methodological advantage to cognitive science over a certain view of analytic philosophy that makes the approach Fodor takes sensible.
If one takes the view that a strand of analytic philosophy, what some have labelled ‘standard analytic epistemology’ (SAE), promotes the idea that one can uncover the nature of concepts like ‘Justification’ by appeal to reason or a ‘reflective equilibrium’, and one considers the criticism of the SAE program as an unsuccessful methodology, then one can see how it follows that someone like Fodor can on the one hand agree with the metaphysical subtext of much of SAE, yet disagree methodologically with SAE and remain a cognitive scientist and study mental states.[3] While Frege might be correct about the externality of concepts like Number and their metaphysical role, I would argue that philosophy, science, and more generally humanity (except for Ernest Sosa[4]) is at a loss as to how to access the a priori through the methods of SAE. While there seems to be a universality to the notion of Number as well as an a priori character to it, one must resort to a science of instantiation of mental states in getting closer to uncovering something about the objectivity of concepts, and other seemingly universal concepts. Frege was clearly aware of the difficulty of a priori elucidation, and this is shown by his choice to assess something even Fodor would argue is too external to ‘Thought’ in the hopes of uncovering the nature of concepts; language. The idea is that, while Fodor does agree with SAE that concepts are in some sense a priori/external, he would disagree that the method of achieving an understanding concepts is introspection, while also disagreeing with the view that a dispositional analysis, something he claims is critical to cognitive science today, is the correct way of attaining concepts.
Thus there is a virtue in Fodor’s approach; while the analytic philosopher might cringe, a cognitive science that looks closely at the role of concepts as mental particulars and parts of mental states, might give an account, and be the only approach capable of giving such an account, of concepts as instantiated across cultures, and even species, and that partially preserves the non-psychological nature of Frege’s mission in the Grundlagen insofar as concepts themselves are independent of the cognisor. The goal for Frege was to get an account of the essence concepts that was non-psychologistic, and I would argue that insofar as Fodor seeks a cognitive science that provides metaphysical account of concepts, there may be more similarity at play than someone might think. But in the same way that Frege sought concepts in their objective sense and resorted to an approach that looked at their use, Fodor is also looking at concepts ontologically whilst also resorting to a cognitive science approach in which one studies concepts within the context of their instantiation as mental states. There might be a universality to the concept of number, and, as Fodor points out, one would be mistaken in looking at the concept as a disposition. However, one can be a metaphysician about concepts and still be a scientist by looking at the way concepts are instantiated in mental states, in the same way that one can be a metaphysician about the concept of number while resorting to studying the role of number in the context of language.
Word count: 2308
Work cited:
Fodor, Jerry A.. Concepts: where cognitive science went wrong. Oxford: Clarendon Press ;, 1998. Print.
Frege, Gottlob. The foundations of arithmetic; a logico-mathematical enquiry into the concept of number.. 2d rev. ed. Evanston, Ill.: Northwestern University Press, 19681959. Print.
[1] By externalism I mean the view that the objective nature of any concept C exists independently of a cognisor’s ability to understand the concept, even if said cognisor uses the concept; the concept of Number for instance, Frege would argue, has an ontological status independent of a cognisor’s capacity to use it. This view is still held by cognitive scientists today insofar as the data shows any alternative is implausible. See Alvin Goldman’s The Philosophical Applications of Cognitive Science, 1998.
[2] See Origins of Analytic Philosophy by Michael Dummett,1993. and Michael Dummett on Frege as hear on the Philosophy Bites podcast, October 7th 2010.
[3] See: Bishop and Trout, Epistemology and the Psychology of Human Judgement, 2005; Knobe and Nichols:Experimental Philosophy, 2008.
No comments:
Post a Comment