Moral Development, Ethical Perception, and Character: Nussbaum, Burnyeat, and Wagner

Moral Development, Ethical Perception, and Character:

Nussbaum, Burnyeat, and Wagner

        When reading the works of Nussbaum and Burnyeat, one gets the idea that the ‘intellectualist’^[1]  tools fashioned for understanding and navigating within ethical phenomena are ill-suited for their purpose; while algorithms and definitions provide a useful aid and description of scientific and mathematical thinking, they seem to be inherently limited when used in situations that are ethical in nature. In this essay, I will argue that this criticism of an ‘intellectualised’ approach to ethics is successful insofar as: a) perception, as it is meant in virtue theory, is absent in intellectual/abstract approaches to ethical phenomena, and is at the same time an essential feature of ethical phenomena that a theory of ethics has to take into account; and b) the importance of character and value is not accounted for in intellectualist theories of ethics, also needs to be accounted in describing and guiding ethical theory. I will first provide an analysis of both Nussbaum and Burnyeat’s arguments against intellectualism and the practical tools they develop as a reaction to its shortcomings; namely: moral development, ethical perception, and the importance of character. I will then argue that these are essential to understanding ethical phenomena by drawing examples from scene four of act two in Wagner’s Die Walküre.

        Burnyeat’s critique of ‘intellectualism’ in ethics revolves around his attempt to look at how one acquires virtue; while Socrates provides an abstract account of this process, wherein one must first know what virtue is to know how it is acquired, Aristotle signals towards a notion of development, wherein one must come to know what virtue is through practice and experience. Practice, for Aristotle, is a kind of habituation: while Socrates thought of virtue as a kind of knowledge of definitions, Aristotle, according to Burnyeat, emphasized the ‘importance of beginnings and the gradual development of good habits and feelings’. (Burnyeat 206) Claiming that virtue is knowledge does not account for, as Burnyeat points out, the akratic individual; someone who knows what the right thing to do is but cannot bring themselves to do it. This example is inherently contradictory from the Socratic perspective, but from Aristotle’s perspective, it is something expected: one cannot expect someone to read a definition of virtue and start being virtuous; being virtuous presupposes a life where one cultivates the ability to a) discern the ‘that’, b) have the appropriate internal response to the ‘that’, and c) to act appropriately given the ‘that’ that presents itself to the individual. Thus, Burnyeat’s criticism of intellectualism in ethical theory hails from the perspective of the importance of the development of moral character, and the inability of a purely rational picture of ethics to capture the problem of akrasia; a) intellectualised ethical theory does not give a coherent picture of how one acquires virtue, and b) intellectualised ethical theory leads to the problem of akratic individual.

        While Burnyeat’s criticism of intellectualism arises from concerns with the development of virtue, Nussbaum criticises intellectualism in ethical theory insofar as it gives too much weight to rationality and the logical form of decision-making, while ignoring so-called subjective elements like emotion and imagination that, according to Aristotle, are fundamental in ethical perception. According to Nussbaum, ‘contemporary writing in moral philosophy’ argues that ethical decision-making should mirror scientific or rational choice in fundamental ways. In a way similar to Plato, contemporary ethical theorists focus on the importance of a ‘science of measurement’; a way of keeping human beings away from ‘unendurable confusion in the face of (...) qualitative indefiniteness and (...) variegated plurality of apparent values’. (Nussbaum 56) This method entails a translation of ethical problems into a ‘single quantitative standard of value’ that is geared towards ‘maximisation’; the idea that ‘the point of rational choice is to produce the greatest amount of the single value at work in each case.’ (Ibid.) Attempts to define the ‘content of the end’, Nussbaum claims, were in her time, as well as Aristotle’s, focused with pleasure as this single unit of value; that which ethical decision-making is aimed at maximising in all cases. (Ibid.) Nussbaum responds to both the notion of a single value in ethical decision-making and the notion that ethical decision making should mirror scientific reasoning by: a) showing that pleasure or happiness fail as a single value, and b) showing that a fixation on the rational aspect of ethical decision-making has a fatal lacunae; it leaves both the theme of character and value, as well as the theme ofethical perception, out of ethical theory. I will first show why happiness is not the single value for Nussbaum, and then explain how perception is fundamental to ethics on her view; this will clearly indicate why the two intellectualist criterion stated above are ill-suited principles for understanding ethical phenomena.

        Nussbaum, drawing from Aristotle, argues that a single-valued metric is simply not the way ethical phenomena presents itself; she argues that Aristotle defends a view of choice as ‘a quality-based selection among goods that are plural and heterogeneous, each being chosen for its own distinctive value.’ (57) This is to be contrasted with a quantity based approach in which goods are valuable not on their own terms, but instead only have value insofar as they fall under an overarching universal value like ‘happiness’ or ‘pleasure’. Aristotle argues against this by showing that 1) pleasure is not a general term insofar as it is inseparable from the particulars it is a feature of, and 2) there are things people value, like ‘seeing, remembering, knowing, having the excellences’ for example, and which they would strive and choose these things even if they did not bring pleasure. (Ibid.)

In relation to the first point, Aristotle is arguing is that particulars of pleasure, like the pleasure derived from eating and the pleasure derived from physical activity, are not aptly generalised into a type called ‘pleasure’ insofar as these pleasures are virtually inseparable from the things within which they are instantiated; culinary pleasure and pleasure drawn from exercise are qualitatively distinct in more ways than they are qualitatively associated, and therefore it is senseless to generalise them into an abstract category of pleasure. Thus, the intellectualist, or more generally, the consequentialist perspective, is wrong in positing a unitary value according to Aristotle. In relation to the second point, Aristotle is saying that there are actions ‘we choose (...) for (their) own sake alone’; meaning that we do not do them for interests external to the action itself. (66) The idea of an action’s  intrinsic worth will come up in the following discussion, but for now, it is clear that Aristotle’s idea of an action’s intrinsic worth starkly contrasts with the the intellectualist view of ethics as instrumental: the perspective where ethics is never something valuable in-itself, but only valuable as a means to an end. Before I move on to Nussbaum and Aristotle’s idea of perception, I want to quickly say that, for Aristotle, the ‘intellectualist’ approach is hindered by a failed normative account as well a failed descriptive account; its senseless to ask human beings to seek a universal that does not exist (pleasure), and if human beings act in non-instrumental ways, if they do things for their own sake, that is, then intellectualism fails to describe the actual decision-making process carried out by human beings. This melds well with the criticism of  so-called ‘hyper-rational’ approaches to ethics, and even epistemology, that prescribe impossible tasks to human beings, like knowing the definition of ‘virtue’ or ‘justification’, in the spirit of ideals; these approaches, as is shown in Burnyeat and Nussbaum, fail to provide a proper prescriptive theory, and this is likely due to the failure of the descriptive element of their theory. I will now illustrate the notion of perception for Aristotle and Nussbaum.

When looking at the intellectual theories of ethics, one gets the idea that ethical decisions should be made purely abstractly and without appeal to the senses. By appealing to ‘general rules’ or ‘principles’, one must not even look at the particularity of a situation to know what the right/rational action is; one simply assumes certain impartial principles and ‘applies them to each new case’. (66) While this might seem like the right method if one considers all situations to be identical, Aristotle argues that no two ethical situations are identical, and therefore deductive approaches should be substituted by ‘concrete situational judgements of a more informal and intuitive kind (...)’(Ibid.) Why is it that, for Aristotle, one should adopt an informal approach instead of a pure abstraction to achieve proper discernment of ethical relevance? Aristotle views proper discernment as one that ‘grasp(s) particulars in all their richness and concreteness’; an activity that requires perception and not abstraction to be successful. (77) While one might be able to solve for the hypotenuse of a triangle without seeing it if one knows enough about it insofar as geometrical situations are identical, ethical situations are inherently particular and require an approach grounded in a certain kind of perception; a perception grounded inphantasia. While phantasia is a complex idea that I cannot completely explain in this essay, it is enough for now to say that it while phantasia is constituted by imagination, Nussbaum is clear to distinguish it from a faculty that is concerned with ‘free fantasy’, and indicates that its ‘job is more to focus on reality than to create unreality’. (77) Phantasia is then, in contrast to abstract reasoning, what one should use and what one does use when grasping the nature of ethical situations; it allows one to actually see what’s at stake; a concrete particular.

There is one thing I want to say before moving on to the final discussion. With his idea of ethical perception, Aristotle opens up the possibility of one learning something new about ethics from ethical phenomena itself, as opposed to the intellectualist who either claims that we already know what virtue is, or can only hope to attain it from pure reason. Insofar as the intellectual approach is grounded in supposed a priori knowledge, one already knows everything relevant about any moral circumstance that will ever happen, or can gain this knowledge through introspection, and thus there is no practical wisdom to be developed whatsoever; ethics is inherently conservative insofar as complete knowledge is assumed and one proceeds from there. Aristotle saves ethics from this conservative perspective by showing a way in which human beings can look at experience, by virtue of phantasia, and discern new knowledge of it. I find this point crucial because, if one argues that one cannot learn anything more about ethics than a utilitarian calculus for instance, then practical wisdom has no relevance in relation to ethical decision making, and one has then effectively thrown out the importance of character and value in all of ethics. It will be my task in the upcoming discussion to show that this cannot be true insofar as taking values, character and perception out of ethical situations makes them empty and meaningless; without perception and character there is no tension in life; without tension there is no deliberation; without deliberation there is no ethics.

Now that I’ve looked at Burnyeat and Nussbaum’s criticisms of the intellectual approach to ethics, I want to use their ideas to approach a scene in Richard Wagner’s Die Walkure and show that patently ethical situations lose all of their meaning if one assumes an intellectualist approach to ethics; understanding the salient features of this scene requires that one understands the importance of perception in developing practical wisdom and discerning the particular, as well as the fundamental role played by character in ethical situations. Thus, I will attempt to synthesize Burnyeat’s insight into the importance of moral development with Nussbaum’s view of the importance of character and perception, and use this synthesis as an interpretive tool to understand a crucial scene in this opera.While it will be impossible to give a complete context of the events that take place in act two given the length of this essay, I will do my best to raise the issues most relevant to understanding the scene from the perspective of the characters involved; this should help in elucidating the matters of moral salience later insofar as character is itself linked with the discernment of moral particulars.

The characters I want to call attention to are both ‘Siegmund’ and ‘Sieglinde’, as well as ‘Brunhilde’. Siegmund and Sieglinde are lovers and siblings, are the sole members of the ‘Walsung’ race, and are running away from certain death at the hands of those who seek them; Sieglinde’s true husband ‘Hunding’ and his fellow cronies. Because a) they are siblings and b) they consummated their marriage despite Sieglinde already being married, they have broken universal laws of marriage, which are enforced by Wotan’s (God) wife Fricka (the goddess of marriage)^[2], and must pay for this breach of universal law with death.

As the relevant scene begins, the twins are quickly resting before continuing their escape, and Brunhilde, a Valkyrie and Wotan’s daughter, arrives in an attempt to convince Siegmund to abandon Sieglinde and go with her to Valhalla; she has been reluctantly assigned to do this by Wotan himself.  If Siegmund goes to Valhalla he will a) be saved from certain death, b) be rejoined with his father, and c) have access to infinite pleasures ranging from the finest ales to the most beautiful women. However, when Siegmund learns that he would have to abandon his love Sieglinde in order to go to Valhalla, he exclaims: ‘(t)hen greet for me (Valhalla) , greet for me Wotan , greet for me (Volsa) , and all the heroes; greet all those fair and lovely maidens. To (Valhalla) I will not go!’ (Wagner 119)  At first, Brunhilde is extremely confused and angry about this; on the one hand Siegmund is disobeying a divine command, and on the other, he seems to be foolishly giving up infinite pleasure in the interest of certain death. Brunhilde asks: ‘So little do you value everlasting bliss? Is she everything to you, this poor woman who, tired and sorrowful, lies limp in your lap? Do you think nothing else glorious?’ (120) Siegmund responds by questioning Brunnhilde’s perspective; ‘So young and fair you seem to my eyes; but how cold and hard I know in my heart! You came to mock me; now leave me alone, you heartless, cold, cruel maid! (...) may my grief gladden your envious heart’(120-121).^[3] At this point, there is a complete shift in Brunhilde’s character; Brunhilde completely changes course, and, despite the fact that she is herself now breaking a divine command, vows to Sieglinde; ‘I see the distress and grief in your heart, I feel all your suffering, share in your pain! Siegmund, I’ll care for your wife; I’ll shield her safely from harm.’ (121)

This is all I think is necessary to say of this scene to discuss the moral phenomena at play. Why do I think this scene is relevant to the themes I stated earlier? In terms of moral development and ethical perception, Brunhilde’s complete shift in perspective is a function of her altering her perception of the situation, and this in fact enables her to a) discern the importance of the situation, and b) learn something new about ethics and love. While she was at first only looking at the situation abstractly, in the sense that ‘anybody in their right mind would choose infinite pleasure over death’, as well as from her perspective as a Valkyrie who should blindly follow orders, when she began to look at the situation as a particular, from Siegmund’s perspective by listening to him speak to him about the value of love, this general principle lost its raison d’etre; pleasure was not the salient feature despite its seeming universality, and following her heart was more important than following commands when it came to choosing the right action. What Brunhilde did, I would argue, is discern the particular of the situation through a kind of ethical perception, as opposed to the kind of blind rationality Aristotle warns against. While the moment cannot be put into words and must be seen while watching the opera, there is one single moment at which the music completely shifts in energy and one can see that Brunhilde has not only discerned the relevance of the situation, but she has also learned what love really is through understanding Siegmund’s perspective. Learning what love is, for Brunhilde, was nothing like learning a definition: it involved perceiving something, and not only that, it required a shift in character as opposed to a reinforcement of prior knowledge; a kind of moral development as opposed to blind application of a principle. This moment, along with Siegmund’s outright refusal to abandon Sieglinde, is a testament to the role of discernment and perception in ethical phenomena.

In terms of character, one can immediately see the futility, as well as seeming naivete, of applying abstract principles to this situation; thinking that everyone strives for pleasure is shown to have no ecological validity when one considers that people are willing to give up pleasure for things they value for their own sake. In this case, Siegmund’s character, being what it was, implied that giving up Sieglinde was inconceivable for him even if one attempted to substitute the role she played for him with something else of supposedly equal or greater value^[4]. This shows above all that values are relative to character, and that universal prescriptions of value are not made with the complexity of human nature and ethical phenomena in mind. What would we say of an individual who looked at this scene in disgust because of Siegmund’s failure to apply a utilitarian calculus? We would encourage them to look at the situation anew with greater empathy, emotion, and imagination, insofar as they have exhibited a failure to discern the salient elements of the scene. While the intellectual approach might say that we’ve entered too deeply into the realm of the subjective, the only response to this concern is that subjectivity is in fact well-suited and necessary for proper discernment. Even if an objective calculus was built, and the answer it provided to Siegmund was somehow ‘stay with Sieglinde’, I would argue that this result would be insignificant insofar as it was not, and should not be, the sole determinant of Siegmund’s action; Siegmund’s decision was made with the total-involvement of his character and without internal struggle, and that is why his decision was virtuous. There’s a subtle humour in Siegmund when he rejects Brunhilde’s terms, when his lines are heard within the context of the music, that I think indicates the absurdity and inconceivability of doing anything else but stay with Sieglinde for him; this is symptomatic of a human being with character.  

 In conclusion, I think I have shown that if one does not assume themes that lay at the core of virtue theory, namely those of moral development, ethical perception, and character, ethical phenomena in a sense loses its content. When attempting to use the intellectual tools criticised by Nussbaum and Burnyeat, as opposed to the tools these authors developed, to discern the ethical relevance in act two ofDie Walkure, one is committed to absurd conclusions that virtue theory does not condemn one to accept. On the other hand, if one assumes the themes of virtue theory stated above, the scene unfolds in a way that comports well with an intuitive ethical understanding.

Work Cited:
Burnyeat, Myles. Aristotle on learning to be good in Rorty, Amélie. Essays on Aristotle's ethics. Berkeley: University of California Press, 1980. Print

Nussbaum, Martha Craven. Love's knowledge: essays on philosophy and literature. New York: Oxford University Press, 1990. Print.

Wagner, Richard. Translated: Andrew Porter The ring of the Nibelung. United States: W.Norton. 1976.

---

[1] I will be using ‘intellectualist’ within the spirit of ‘intellectualism’ as used by Burnyeat in Aristotle on Learning to Be Good; referring to a loose confederation of theses concerned with a achieving a logical  and universal account of  both normative and descriptive ethics; how we do reason, and how we ought to reason given ethical situations.

[2] It should be said that the drama between Fricka and Wotan, while it will not be mentioned in this essay, merits its own discussion at a later date.

[3] My italics; consider this phrase within the context of the tripartite view of the soul.

[4] This is relevant when considering Nussbaum’s discussion concerning friendship and substitution. (pg.60 Love’s Knowledge)